by P D Ouspensky
On one occasion while talking with Gurdjieff, I asked him whether he considered it possible to attain 'cosmic consciousness', not for a brief moment only but for a longer period. I understood the expression 'cosmic consciousness' in the sense of a higher consciousness possible for Man in the same way in which I had previously written about it in my book Tertium Organum.
"I do not know what you mean by 'cosmic consciousness'" said G. "It is a vague and indefinite term; anyone can call anything he likes by it. In most cases what is called 'cosmic consciousness' is simply fantasy, associative day-dreaming connected with intensified work of the emotional centre. Sometimes it comes near to ecstasy, but most often it is merely a subjective emotional experience on the level of dreams. But even apart from all this, before we can speak of 'cosmic consciousness' we must define in general what consciousness is. How do you define consciousness?"
"Consciousness is considered to be indefinable", I said, "and indeed, how can it be defined if it is an inner quality? With the ordinary means at our disposal it is impossible to prove the presence of consciousness in another man. We know it only in ourselves."
"All this is rubbish", said G., "the usual scientific sophistry. It is time you got rid of it. Only one thing is true in what you have said: that you can know consciousness only in yourself. Observe that I say 'you can know', for you can know it only when you have it. And when you have not got it, you can know that you have not got it not at that very moment, but afterwards. I mean that when it comes again you can see that it has been absent a long time, and you can find or remember the moment when it disappeared and when it reappeared.
"You can also define the moments when you are nearer to consciousness and further away from consciousness. But by observing in yourself the appearance and the disappearance of consciousness you will inevitably see one fact which you neither see nor acknowledge now, and that is that moments of consciousness are very short and are separated by long intervals of completely unconscious, mechanical working of the machine.
"You will then see that you can think, feel, act, speak, work, without being conscious of it. And if you learn to see in yourselves the moments of consciousness and the long periods of mechanicalness, you will as infallibly see in other people when they are conscious of what they are doing and when they are not.
"Your principal mistake consists in thinking either that that you always have consciousness, and in general, either that consciousness is always present or that it is never present. In reality consciousness is a property which is continually changing. Now it is present, now it is not present. And there are different degrees and different levels of consciousness. Both consciousness and the different degrees of consciousness must be understood in oneself by sensation, by taste.
"No definitions can help you in this case and no definitions are possible so long as you do not understand what you have to define. And science and philosophy cannot define consciousness because they want to define it where it does not exist. It is necessary to distinguish consciousness from the possibility of consciousness. We have only the possibility of consciousness and rare flashes of it. Therefore we cannot define what consciousness is."
I cannot say that what was said about consciousness became clear to me at once. But one of the subsequent talks explained to me the principles on which these arguments were based. On one occasion, at the beginning of a meeting, G. put a question to which all those present had to answer in turn. The question was: "What is the most important thing that we notice during self-observation?"
Some of those present said that during attempts at self-observation, what they had felt particularly strongly was an incessant flow of thoughts which they had found impossible to stop. Others spoke of the difficulty of distinguishing the work of one centre from the work of another.
I had evidently not understood the question, or I answered my own thoughts, because I said that what struck me most was the connectedness of one thing with another in the system, the wholeness of the system, as if it were an 'organism', and the entirely new significance of the word to know which included not only the idea of knowing this thing or that, but the connection between this thing and everything else.
G. was obviously dissatisfied with our replies. I had already begun to understand him in such circumstances and I saw that he expected from us indications of something definite that we had either missed or failed to understand.
"Not one of you has noticed the most important thing that I have pointed out to you", he said. "That is to say, not one of you has noticed that you do not remember yourselves. You do not feel yourselves; you are not conscious of yourselves. With you, 'it observes' just as 'it speaks', 'it thinks', 'it laughs'. You do not feel: I observe, I notice, I see. Everything still 'is noticed', 'is seen'. In order really to observe oneself one must first of all remember oneself. Try to remember yourselves when you observe yourselves and later on tell me the results. Only those results will have any value that are accompanied by self-remembering. Otherwise you yourselves do not exist in your observations. In such a case, what are all your observations worth?"
These words of G's made me think a great deal. It seemed to me at once that they were the key to what he had said before about consciousness. But I decided to draw no conclusions whatever, but to try to remember myself while observing myself.
The very first attempts showed me how difficult it was. Attempts at self-remembering failed to give any results except to show me that in actual fact we never remember ourselves.
"What else do you want?" said G. "This is a very important realisation. People who know this already know a great deal. The whole trouble is that nobody knows it. If you ask a man whether he can remember himself, he will of course answer that he can. If you tell him that he cannot remember himself, he will either be angry with you, or he will think you an utter fool. The whole of life is based on this, the whole of human existence, the whole of human blindness. If a man really knows that he cannot remember himself, he is already near to the understanding of his being."
All that G. said, all that I myself thought, and especially all that my attempts at self-remembering had shown me, very soon convinced me that I was faced with an entirely new problem which science and philosophy had not, so far, come across. [The best discussion of this important subject that I have so far been able to find is in Intuitive Thinking As A Spiritual Path by Rudolf Steiner. Ed.]
But before making deductions, I will try to describe my attempts to remember myself.
The first impression was that attempts to remember myself or to be conscious of myself, to say to myself 'I am walking', 'I am doing', and continually to feel this I, stopped thought. When I was feeling I, I could neither think nor speak; even sensations became dimmed. Also, I could remember myself in this way only for a very short time.
I had previously made certain experiments in stopping thought which are mentioned in books on Yoga practices. And my first attempts to self-remember reminded me exactly of these, my first experiments. Actually it was almost the same thing with one difference: that in stopping thoughts, attention is wholly directed to the effort of not admitting thoughts, while in self-remembering attention becomes divided one part of it is directed towards the same effort and the other part to the feeling of self.
This last realisation enabled me to come to a certain, possibly a very incomplete, definition of 'self-remembering' which nevertheless proved to be very useful in practice.
I am speaking of the division of attention which is the characteristic feature of self-remembering. I represented it to myself in the following way:
When I observe something, my attention is directed towards what I observe a line with one arrowhead pointing away from me. When at the same time I try to remember myself, my attention is directed both towards the object observed and towards myself. The line of attention acquires a second arrowhead pointing towards myself.
Having defined this I saw that the problem consisted in directing attention on oneself without weakening or obliterating the attention directed on something else. Moreover this 'something else' could as well be within me as outside me.
The very first attempts at such a division of attention showed me its possibility. At the same time I saw two things clearly.
In the first place I saw that self-remembering resulting from this method had nothing in common with 'self-feeling' or 'self-analysis'. It was a new and very interesting state with a strangely familiar flavour.
And secondly I realised that moments of self-remembering do occur in life, although rarely. Only the deliberate production of these moments created the sensation of novelty. Actually I had been familiar with them from early childhood. They came either in new and unexpected surroundings, in a new place, among new people while travelling, for instance, when suddenly one looks about one and says: 'How strange! I and in this place'; or in very emotional moments, in moments of danger, in moments when it is necessary to keep one's head, when one hears one's own voice and sees and observes oneself from the outside.
I saw quite clearly that my first recollections of life, in my own case very early ones, were moments of self-remembering. This last realisation revealed much else to me. That is, I saw that I really only remember those moments of the past in which I remembered myself. Of the others I know only that they took place. I am not able to wholly revive them, to experience them again. But the moments when I had remembered myself were alive and were in no way different from the present.
I was still afraid to come to conclusions. But I already saw that I stood upon the threshold of a very great discovery. I had always been astonished at the weakness and insufficiency of our memory. So many things disappear. For some reason or other the chief absurdity of life for me consisted in this. Why experience so much in order to forget it afterwards?
Besides there was something degrading in this. A man feels something which seems to him very big, he thinks he will never forget it; one or two years pass by and nothing remains of it. It now became clear to me why this was so and why it could not be otherwise. If our memory really keeps alive only moments of self-remembering, it is clear why our memory is so poor.
All these were revelations of the first days. Later, when I began to learn to divide attention, I saw that self-remembering gave wonderful sensations which, in a natural way, that is, by themselves, come to us only very seldom and in exceptional conditions. Thus, for instance, at that time I used very much to like to wander through St Petersburg at night and to 'sense' the houses and the streets. St Petersburg is full of these strange sensations. Houses, especially old houses, were quite alive; I all but spoke to them. There was no 'imagination' in it. I did not think of anything. I simply walked along while trying to remember myself and looked about; the sensations came by themselves.
Later I was to discover many unexpected things in the same way. But I will speak of this later.
Sometimes self-remembering was not successful. Things I observed distracted me. On one occasion I had been walking along a particular street remembering myself, thought about cigarettes, and at this thought I seemed all at once to fall and disappear into a deep sleep. At the same time, immersed in this sleep, I had continued to perform consistent and expedient actions. I had left the tobacconist, called at my flat, telephoned to the printers, written two letters. Then again I went out of the house and took a cab to the printers. On the way I began to feel a strange uneasiness as though I had forgotten something.... And suddenly I remembered that I had forgotten to remember myself.
I spoke of my observations and deductions to the people in our group as well as to my various literary friends and others.
I told them that this was the centre of gravity of the whole system and of all work on oneself; that now work on myself was no longer only empty words but a real fact full of significance, thanks to which psychology becomes an exact and, at the same time, a practical science.
I said that European and Western psychology in general had overlooked a fact of tremendous importance, namely, that we do not remember ourselves; that we live and act and reason in deep sleep not metaphorically but in absolute reality. And also that, at the same time, we can remember ourselves if we make sufficient efforts, that we can awaken.
I was struck by the difference between the understanding of the people who belonged to our groups and that of people outside them. The people who belonged to our groups understood, though not all at once, that we had come into contact with a 'miracle', and that it was something 'new', something that had never existed anywhere before.
The other people did not understand this; they took it all too lightly, and sometimes they even began to prove to me that such theories had existed before.
A L Volinsky, whom I had often met and with whom I had talked a great deal since 1909 and whose opinions I valued very much, did not find in the idea of 'self-remembering' anything that he had not known before. "This is apperception", he said to me. "Have you read Wundt's [Wilhelm Max Wundt, 1832-1920, German physiologist and psychologist, founder of experimental psychology. Ed.] Logic? You will find there his latest definition of apperception. It is exactly the same with the thing you speak of: 'Simple observations' is perception; 'Observation with self-remembering', as you call it, is apperception. Of course Wundt knew of it."
I did not want to argue with Volinsky. I had read Wundt. And of course what Wundt had written was not at all what I had said to Volinsky. Wundt had come close to this idea, but others had come just as close and had afterwards gone off in a different direction. He had not seen the magnitude of the idea which was hidden behind his thoughts about different forms of perception. And not having seen the magnitude of the idea, he of course could not see the central position which the idea of the absence of consciousness, and the idea of the possibility of the voluntary creation of this consciousness, ought to occupy in our thinking. Only it seemed strange to me that Volinsky could not see this even when I pointed it out to him.
I subsequently became convinced that this idea was hidden by an impenetrable veil for many otherwise very intelligent people and still later on I saw why this was so.